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The Power of the Agrarian Myth:
The Trend of Protectionist Agricultural Policy in US Legislation
  71
There is a general consensus among 
academics that agricultural trade liberalization 
is economically favorable to consumers. 
According to Pasour, protectionist measures 
such as “marketing orders, import controls, 
export subsidies, and other restrictions on 
competition, distort the allocation of resources 
and restrict individuals’ freedom to engage in 
mutually beneficial exchange” (Pasour, 2005: 
317). The American public should favor 
liberalization, generally “Voters-as-consumers 
prefer liberal trade policies that lower prices 
and raise real incomes” (Kono, 2006:369). 
However, the domestic policy of the US is 
biased against agricultural trade liberalization. 
Historically there has been a consistent trend 
favoring protectionist measures, such as 
agricultural price supports, in US agricultural 
legislation with no significant public opposition. 
So why is the US government biased against 
agricultural trade liberalization and why does 
the American public not protest against these 
policies? This question is especially baffling 
when you consider the extremely small 
percentage of  the American population that 
are agriculturalists; “far less than 1 percent of 
Americans live on what would be considered 
full-time farms and ranches” (Browne, 2001:8). 
So why do farmers consistently receive a high 
level of government protection? 
According to Browne, the agrarian myth 
is powerful enough to have “supported 
farm policy intervention by and within 
what was once a generally laissez-faire U.S. 
government”(2001:xiv). The ‘agrarian myth’ 
will be defined in this paper as Jeffersonian 
Agrarianism: “a belief in the moral and 
economic primacy of farming over industry” 
(Dixon, 2003:145). I will argue that this myth 
is institutionalized into the US government 
and ingrained in the consciousness of the 
American people, largely because of the 
efforts of agricultural special interests. I will 
first provide a brief overview of the history 
of the agrarian myth and US Farm policy. I 
will use this historical analysis to demonstrate 
that the Agrarian Myth and the use of this 
idea to promote agricultural trade policies has 
been a constant since it was first popularized 
by Jefferson. I will then provide various 
explanations for the success and longevity of 
this myth. I hypothesize that this myth provides 
an ideological explanation for the trend of 
protectionism in US Agricultural Policy. To test 
my hypothesis I will examine the anomaly that 
is the free-market oriented 1996 Farm Bill (the 
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform 
Act, or FAIR) and examine the non-idea 
factors that made the passage of this legislation 
possible. With this analysis I will demonstrate 
that the 1996 Farm Bill is merely a blip on 
the agricultural policy trend line. I will briefly 
discuss how the 2002 Farm Bill reverted to the 
traditional protectionist trend. I will conclude 
that the political setting during the time of FAIR 
deliberations largely explains the blip in the US 
agricultural policy trend line which occurred 
with the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill.
Data/Methodology
In order to understand the agrarian myth 
and its historical relation to agricultural 
trade policy in the US, I relied primarily on 
scholarly articles analyzing farm legislation, 
how its passage was affected by pressure 
from farm lobby groups, and the historical 
influence of the agrarian myth in government. 
I examined the websites of the USDA and of 
various farm lobby groups, particularly their 
mission statements, policy goals, and sections 
on legislative relationships for evidence of 
agrarianism rhetoric and to determine where 
in government agricultural lobby pressure 
was being applied and for what purposes. 
I examined reactions of farm lobbies to 
agricultural legislation and how this effected 
future legislation. Analyzing data in this area 
can be difficult as much of it is politically 
biased. Small farm interests tend to appeal 
for Democratic support, while free-market 
oriented agribusiness lobby groups have 
different agendas and tend to appeal for 
Republican support. Farm statistics and analysis 
of legislation often differ depending on  
the orientation of the organization forwarding 
this information.
Analysis of the Agrarian Myth and 
Institutionalized Protectionism in US 
Government
The Agrarian myth and agricultural bias 
in US government originated from President 
Thomas Jefferson’s rhetoric which articulated the 
idea that the hard-working and self-dependent 
nature of agrarians would provide the basis for a 
wholesome American society and that “family 
farmers were needed to preserve democracy 
because of their tendency to be farsighted and 
committed” (Browne, 2002:51). With a basis 
in this myth, modern US farm policy emerged 
in 1862 with the conception of the Agricultural 
Establishment. The Establishment was formed by 
policy makers to forward the goals of agricultural 
modernization and western development. In 
1914 the USDA was elevated to full cabinet 
status meaning “a farm and ranch advocate 
served as presidential advisor on at least formal 
institutional par with advisors such as the Secretary 
of  War” (Browne, 2001:40). This allowed the 
Establishment to successfully institutionalize a 
protectionist farm bias and the special treatment 
of agriculturalists into US government.
In the 1930s, as a result of the collapse of 
farm prices during the Great Depression, the 
number of farm-oriented institutions increased 
as did populist policy intervention emphasizing 
selective benefits for producers. With the 
passage of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act in 1933, “price supports and the loan 
guarantees that were added to them became 
the real foundation of U.S. agricultural policy 
throughout the remainder of the millennium” 
(Browne, 2001:42). Originally intended as 
temporary measures, the policies passed in this 
era continue to influence farm policy. Much 
of U.S. agricultural commodity policy has its 
foundations in the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1938, the Commodity Credit Corporation 
Charter Act of 1948, and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1949, known as agriculture’s 
‘permanent legislation’. When enacted in the 
1930s agrarian myth was relevant; about 25% 
of the US population lived on farms, agriculture 
employed 40% of the workforce, agriculture’s 
direct contribution to GDP was 7%, and farms 
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were generally small and owner-operated 
(Young, 1996). The Agrarian Myth is now 
outdated. In 1996 less than 2% of Americans 
lived on farms, production agriculture’s 
contribution to GDP was 1.5%, and the small 
farm was the exception with “20 percent of farm 
operations producing 80 percent of total U.S. 
agricultural output” (Young, 1996:2).
Despite its irrelevance to modern America, 
the agrarian myth continues to survive. The 
preservers of this myth include bureaucratic 
service providers, who “believe in the need 
to keep established institutions alive”, and 
agricultural interest groups, “who simply 
keep resurrecting the myth to protect and 
expand their own extensive public policy 
benefits” (Browne, 2001:60). The success 
of these groups in preserving the myth may 
be attributed to the pervasive hopefulness 
inherent in the American psyche; “America 
is a land of dreams, of wishful thinking- and 
generally inadequate understanding of 
the physical conditions to which dreams 
wander” (Browne, 2001: 3). Because the 
Agrarian myth is so deeply entrenched in 
the values of the American public, legislators 
feel confident that they can continue to 
vote for agricultural protectionist policies 
without negative political repercussions, while 
being rewarded politically and monetarily 
by farm lobbies. Gwande&Hoekman find 
that although agricultural protectionism 
in the US tends to result in deadweight 
loss, “lobbying spending provides access 
to politicians” and “interest group money 
bends agricultural policy in the United 
States” (Gwande&Hoekman, 2006:556). 
The influence of agriculture’s institutionalized 
interests on US legislators is evidenced in the 
1985 farm bill where “eligibility for commodity 
payments was made contingent on a farmer’s 
successful implementation of environmental 
programs”(Browne, 2001:109). This provoked 
outrage among farmers. As a result policy 
makers distanced themselves from this scheme. 
The policy change which occurred in the 
1996 Farm Bill was much more radical than 
that of the 1985 bill; “Under FAIR, target-price 
deficiency payments and annual land-idling 
programs are to be eliminated for at least the 
next seven years, and are to be replaced with 
a fixed schedule of ‘production flexibility 
contract payments’, completely decoupled 
from future market prices of planting decisions” 
(Paarlberg&Orden,1996:1305). In order to 
explain the anomaly that is the 1996 Farm 
Bill, it is important to understand the role of 
institutions in the generation of farm policy. 
Institutions are rules governing behavior which 
“have a specific emphasis on some among the 
many social goals [and] a bias in favor of what 
they each are most capable of doing” (Browne, 
2001: 25) Once established, institutions are 
very difficult to reform or fundamentally change 
because of transaction costs. Transaction 
costs are “the price placed by the political 
process on governmental reform-or any other 
decision” (Browne,2001:25), including the 
deals and tradeoffs necessary for change to 
occur. Institutionalized interest groups cause 
transaction costs in the US associated with 
agricultural policy to be very high. Therefore, 
“policy officials generally govern on the basis 
of past institutional investments”(Browne, 
1996:36), providing a political advantage 
to agricultural institutions. This explains the 
slowness of policy reform (termed institutional 
inertia) and the protectionist trend line in 
agricultural policy.
The structure of congress allows the 
institutionalization of interests and the resulting 
institutional bias for certain interests. Since the 
1930s, Congress has been run by decentralized 
committee rule where “committee and 
subcommittee governance have been organized 
quite well to favor farm constituents and farm 
policy” (Browne, 2001:103). Scholars are 
in agreement over the influential nature of 
interest groups in legislation deliberations; 
“much of the recent analysis of American trade 
politics follows Schattschneider (1935) in 
placing industry-based lobbies at center stage 
(Baldwin, 1985; Grossman&Helpman, 1995)” 
(Hiscox, 2002:593). Because interest groups 
have been able to successfully institutionalize 
themselves in government they are able to 
discourage agricultural policy reform efforts 
among legislators who want to avoid the 
associated transaction and political costs. The 
institutionalization of farm lobbies has also 
provided government legitimation of the 
Agrarian myth, enabling its continued use as a 
tool for policy implementation.
Explanation of the 1996 Farm Bill: a 
divergence in the protectionist policy 
trend
The political setting in the US during FAIR 
deliberations explains the diversion from the 
protectionist trend line in US agricultural policy 
and radical policy change which occurred 
with the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill. From 
1955-94 Democrats held a majority in one 
or both houses of congress. The republican 
midterm election victories in November 
1994 considerably changed the composition 
of congress. This ended the legislative habit 
of passing single-committee based ‘logroll’ 
legislation devised by the  members of the 
agricultural committees who had long been 
viewed as ‘the non-partisan agents of rural and 
urban-rent seekers’ (Paarlberg, 1996:1305). 
During the 104th Congress politics was 
partisan, ‘the average Republican member 
voted with the party leadership over 90% 
of the time, the highest level of support 
within a majority party in more than twelve 
years’ (Paarlberg, 1996:1306). Democrats 
support price-support and supply-control 
agricultural policies which benefit smaller, 
high cost farmers, while Republicans favor 
legislation more favorable to agribusiness, 
such as ‘benefit programs for farmers that 
do not raise market prices or discourage full 
production’ (Paarlberg:1996, 1306). These 
agricultural policy biases are made apparent 
by the types of farm lobbies which favor each 
party, indicated by favorability ratings that these 
lobbies assign to members of congress. In the 
103rd Congress (1993-1994) the National 
Farmers Union (NFU), which lobbies for 
agricultural protection and whose main goal is 
to ‘protect family farms and ranches’ (National 
Farmer’s Union), tended to rate Democratic 
House committee chairs much more favorably 
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than republicans. The opposite is true of the 
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), 
which tends to promote free-market policies 
(Paarlberg, 1996). A Republican dominated 
congress that favored free-market, agribusiness 
oriented farm lobbies provided the political 
environment during FAIR deliberations which 
allowed this legislation to pass. Additionally, 
the 1995/1996 market setting affected the 
political setting which contributed to reform in 
FAIR legislation. The rapid increase in market 
commodity prices during FAIR deliberations 
“explains why changes to the traditional 
farm-price support policies were enacted 
while other farm programs, and most nonfarm 
social entitlements, remained impervious to 
modification by the new political majorities in 
the 104th congress” (Paarlberg, 1996:1305). 
The rival explanation that the presidential 
administration was responsible the passage of 
FAIR is not supported by history. President 
Clinton and Secretary of Agriculture Glickman 
had both “argued that farm policy needed 
no radical change’ (Paarlberg, 1996:1308). 
When Clinton signed FAIR he “pledged (if 
re-elected) to introduce legislation in 1997 to 
re-couple some farm programs and payments 
to the market, to ensure farmers once again 
had a ‘safety net’”(Paarlberg, 1996:1308). 
Additionally, during Clinton’s 1996 reelection 
campaign it would have been irrational for 
him to alienate his agricultural supporters 
and deviate from the party line by supporting 
agricultural free trade measures. 
Young provides the rival explanation that 
international pressures supporting more free 
and open trade coming from the 1986-94 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and 
NAFTA explain the passage of FAIR legislation. 
These institutions did not change the US 
domestic policy bias towards agricultural 
protectionism, but they did influence the 
actions of the Clinton Administration. In 
exchange for the complacency of farm groups 
and to secure the votes needed to include 
GATT negotiations into domestic policy the 
Clinton Administration promised it would 
not endorse major policy changes in the 
upcoming 1995 farm bill debate and would ask 
Congress for “discretionary U.S. Department 
of Agriculture spending levels above the FY 
1995 level for 1996 and FY 1997, plus all of the 
funding for the Export Enhancement Program 
and related U.S. export subsidy policies that 
was permitted under the agreement, plus a 
$600 million increase in a variety of ‘green 
box’ export promotion programs’ (Paarlberg, 
1996:1307). Therefore the GATT and NAFTA 
supported the continuation of protectionist 
policy rhetoric by the Clinton Administration.
Young argued the FAIR Act “accelerates the 
trend towards greater market orientation of the 
previous two major farm acts” (1996:1). My 
research does not support Young’s argument 
for a trend towards liberalization as the 2002 
Act was clearly biased towards protectionism. 
Paarlberg supports my argument that the 
1996 Farm Bill cannot be explained by ideas; 
“absence of a new ideological consensus for 
market-oriented reform is further confirmed  
by the scant changes in the sugar, peanut, 
and dairy programs in 1996” (Paarlberg, 
1996:1308). These industries continued 
to benefit from protectionist policies, with 
no real attempt for reform by Democrats or 
Republicans. Despite some protectionist policy 
continuity, agricultural protectionist sentiment 
to FAIR was negative.
The immediate negative reactions from 
agriculturalist protectionist groups to the 1996 
Farm Bill pressured movement back to the 
protectionist trend line. For example, in the 
agricultural protectionist oriented InMotion 
Magazine, the FAIR Act is attacked as biased 
against family farms and towards corporate 
America, calling for action “to make sure this 
is a short-lived farm bill which will be replaced 
by one that allows family farmers cost of 
production plus a reasonable profit” (Perry, 
2006:1). Evidence of agricultural protectionist 
legislation emerged before the next farm bill. 
In 2001 the largest-scale agricultural producers 
were each eligible for $288,000 in federal 
payments, partially as a result of international 
trade losses (Browne, 2002). The 2002 Farm 
bill reversed many of the market-oriented 
initiatives implemented in 1996 by “increasing 
authorized spending and intervention levels 
in U.S. farm subsidies” (Thompson, 2008:1). 
International opinion interpreted the 2002 
Farm Bill as “an abdication of U.S. leadership 
in reforming farm policy and liberalizing 
agricultural trade” (Thompson, 2008:1). The 
2002 Farm Bill reinstated the ‘farm safety net’ 
and reverted to the protectionist trend line in 
agricultural policy.
The persistence of the Agrarian myth 
explains the protectionist trend line in US 
agricultural trade policy, demonstrating 
that “ideas, as ideals, are as important to 
politics as the politicians themselves and 
those who seek to influence them”(Browne, 
2002:57). Agricultural interests have been 
institutionalized into the legislative branch of 
the US federal government responsible for 
making policy decisions and have consistently 
used the agrarian myth as a tool to forward 
their policy goals. These interest groups 
have built up bi-partisan networks in the 
government, such as the “iron triangle” of pro-
agricultural protectionist legislators, lobbyists, 
and institutional administrators, who make 
agricultural policy reform extremely unlikely. 
The blip in the US agricultural policy trend 
line which occurred with the passage of the 
1996 Farm Bill can be attributed to the political 
setting during the time of FAIR deliberations. 
The 2002 Farm Bill reverted to the traditional 
policy trend of agricultural protectionism, 
demonstrating that the 1996 Farm Bill was 
indeed an anomaly. What will it take to  
cause the demise of the Agrarian Myth in 
America? I pose this question for future  
debate and research.
by Emily Iwan
